fix(security): don't reuse IV for cryptography
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Kalista Payne
parent
74fc543ef2
commit
07275bd522
@@ -75,7 +75,6 @@
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"S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID": "accessKeyId",
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"S3_BUCKET": "bucket",
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"S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY": "secretAccessKey",
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"SESSION_SECRET_IV": "12345678912345678912345678912345",
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"SESSION_SECRET_KEY": "1234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891",
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"SESSION_SECRET": "YOUR SECRET HERE",
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"SITE_HTTP_AUTH_ENABLED": "false",
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@@ -1,26 +1,46 @@
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import {
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createCipheriv,
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createDecipheriv,
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randomBytes,
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} from 'crypto';
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import nconf from 'nconf';
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const algorithm = 'aes-256-ctr';
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const ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-gcm';
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const IV_LENGTH_BYTES = 12; // 96-bit nonce per NIST guidance for GCM
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const AUTH_TAG_LENGTH_BYTES = 16; // 128-bit authentication tag
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const SESSION_SECRET_KEY = nconf.get('SESSION_SECRET_KEY');
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const SESSION_SECRET_IV = nconf.get('SESSION_SECRET_IV');
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const key = Buffer.from(SESSION_SECRET_KEY, 'hex');
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const iv = Buffer.from(SESSION_SECRET_IV, 'hex');
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/**
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* Encrypt a UTF-8 string using AES-256-GCM and return iv|ciphertext|tag as hex.
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* A fresh nonce is generated for every message to avoid keystream reuse, and
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* the auth tag ensures forged payloads are rejected at the trust boundary.
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*/
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export function encrypt (text) {
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const cipher = createCipheriv(algorithm, key, iv);
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let crypted = cipher.update(text, 'utf8', 'hex');
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crypted += cipher.final('hex');
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return crypted;
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const iv = randomBytes(IV_LENGTH_BYTES);
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const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
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const ciphertext = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(text, 'utf8'), cipher.final()]);
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const authTag = cipher.getAuthTag();
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return Buffer.concat([iv, ciphertext, authTag]).toString('hex');
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}
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/**
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* Decrypt an AES-256-GCM payload previously produced by encrypt().
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* The layout is iv (12B) || ciphertext || authTag (16B), all hex encoded.
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*/
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export function decrypt (text) {
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const decipher = createDecipheriv(algorithm, key, iv);
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let dec = decipher.update(text, 'hex', 'utf8');
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dec += decipher.final('utf8');
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return dec;
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const payload = Buffer.from(text, 'hex');
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if (payload.length <= IV_LENGTH_BYTES + AUTH_TAG_LENGTH_BYTES) {
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throw new Error('Encrypted payload is malformed');
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}
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const iv = payload.subarray(0, IV_LENGTH_BYTES);
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const authTag = payload.subarray(payload.length - AUTH_TAG_LENGTH_BYTES);
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const ciphertext = payload.subarray(IV_LENGTH_BYTES, payload.length - AUTH_TAG_LENGTH_BYTES);
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const decipher = createDecipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
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decipher.setAuthTag(authTag);
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const decrypted = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ciphertext), decipher.final()]);
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return decrypted.toString('utf8');
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}
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